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In  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on c o l l e c t i v e  nc t ion  and, more genc ra l ly ,  t h e  . 
s tudy  of p o l i t i c s ,  p o l i t i c a l  power is f r equen t ly  of c e n t r n l  concern. Yet 
deba te s  over  t h e  meaning of power a r e  l e g i o n ,  and s o  inconc lus iva  t h n t  
a t  l e a s t  two major s o c i a l  s c i e u t i s t s  have odvocnted nbnndoning t h e  
concept  a l t o g e t h e r .  [Rilcer 1964 and t(rrrch 19661 I n  t h i s  pnper 1  
w i l l  cons ide r  some r e c e n t  approaches t o  t he  s tudy of power, i nc lud ing  
t h a t  of Chnrles  T i l l y .  nnd d i s c u s s  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which they nvoid soma 
o f  t h e  nlojor p i t f a l l s  o f  previous  s t u d i e s .  
One of t h e  most p e r s i s t e r ~ t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  discuss inp,  power 
(and in f luence ,  which I w i l l  here  use  aynonyrrously, a l t h o i ~ & h  1 am awnre 
o f  d i f f r r e n t  usages) has  heen t h e  s imul taneous  unnge of t h e  term. 
sometimes i n  t h e  same pnragraph, t o  des i enn te  what l lerber t  Simon c a l l a  
"value pos i t i on"  and "value p o t m t i o l "  na wel l  an t h e  a c t  o f  inf l .ueocinp 
i t s e l f .  That i s ,  "power" sometimes i s  equated wi tb  "resources"  (suc11 
a s  money o r  p o l i t i c a l  o f f i c o )  ond sometimes wi th  " a b i l i t y "  o r  "cnpocity" 
t o  accomplish o n e ' s  w i l l ,  whi le  a t  o t h e r  t imes  i t  Ncuns (e.g.,  " exe rc i s ing  
power" o r  " inf luencing")  t h e  process  o f  accomplishing, producing, chnnging. 
o r  n f f c c t i n g  someone o r  ~ o m c t l l i n g . ~  P n r t  of t he  blnlne he re  belon&;s t o  
t h e  inconveniences of t h e  I!nglish language,  which uncoopernt ively  f o i l e d  
t o  provide n  ve rb  f o r  power. " Inf luence"  docs e x i s t  n s  both noun ond verb. 
bu t  mnny people wish t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  shades  of men~~ittl: more p r e c i s e l y ,  and 
do no t  use power and in f luence  a s  synonymous terms. 
ll'llere is a  n i c e  d i scuss ion  of t h i s  problem i n  l lerber t  A. S i w u ' s  
s u b t l e  and i u t e r e s t i n g  a r t i c l e ,  "liotes on the  Observntion nnd Mensuremeor 
of P o l i t i c a l  Power," i n  llodcls o f  Nan, pp. 62-78. 
The t r o u b l e  wi th  us ing  t h e  s w e  te im t o  r e f e r  t o  va lue  p o s i t i o n ,  
value  p o t e n t i a l .  and process  of i n f luenc ing  is t h a t  it l e a d s  t o  muddled 
arguments,  f r equen t ly  c i r c u l a r  i n  na tu re .  I n  d i scuss ing  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
of o p e r a t i o n a l i r i n g  t h e  concept of power, Robert Dahl has  pointed o u t  
t h a t  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g  power a s  r e sources  (value  p o s i t i o n )  
r e s t s  on i n f e r e n c e  a s  t o  what g i v e s  people  t h e  oppor tun i ty  t o  i n f l u e n c e  
' dec i s ions .  Tliue, f r equen t ly  we assume what we a r e  t r y i n g  t o  prove. Some 
of t h e  e a r l i e r  ve r s ions  of t h e  "power e l i t e "  argument, f o r  example. 
e x h i b i t  t l ~ i s  d i f f i c u l t y .  [See Dahl 19571 
In  Prom Mobi l iza t ion t o  Hevolution Churles  T i l l y  n i c e l y  avo ids  
tl ie i n t e l l e c t u a l  confusions  t h a t  r a s u l t  from t h e  ambiguities o f  o u r  
common language. For "value pos i t i on"  he uses  resources .  I n  gene ra l  
he equa te s  r e sources  w i th  t h e  a s s e t s  h e l p f u l  t o  groups i n  i n f luenc ing  
o t h e r  groups and governments. While t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and posses s ions  
s o  des ignated a r e  presumed t o  be r e l e v a n t  t o  power, i t  is n o t  assumed 
t h a t  they c o n s t i t u t e  i t ,  o r  t h a t  t hey  a r e  measures o f  power, o r  t h a t  
t l ~ e y  must be t h e  same i n  every s i t u a t i o n .  I n  t h i s  r ega rd ,  i t  must be  
s t r e s s e d  t h a t ,  whi le  n e t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  r e sources  a r e  measured by t h e  
concept ion of power T i l l y  propo!es, t h e s e  increased r e sources  themeelves 
a r e  no t  powrrr. If they were, we would be back t o  t h e  same c i r c u l a r  
argument i n  mare complex form t h a t  hila a l r eady  bedevi led such d i scuss ions .  
I'owrr here  is no t  an i n c r e a s e  o r  dec reasa  i n  t h i n g s  possessed;  i t  denotes  -
a more complex not ion of t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of group ac t ion .  t h e  r a t i o  
o f  r e t u r n  t o  investment.  The d e f i n i t i o n s  of power a s  capac i ty  o r  a b i l i t y  
o r e  t l~emse lves  r a t h e r  ambiguous, but  ' I ' i l l y ' s  no t ion  o f  mobilization 
c a p t u r e s  t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  i d e a s  embodied h e r e  r a t h e r  we l l ,  s i n c e  i t  
d e s c r i b e s  both  c o l l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  ove r  r e sources  and r ead ines s  t o  a c t  on 
i n t e r e s t s .  llcnce it probably cones a s  c l o s e  t o  g ra sp ing  t h e  no t ion  o f  
"value  p o t e n t i a l "  a s  is f m e i b l e .  T i l l y  d e f i n e s  mob i l i za t ion  a s  "tlie 
e x t e n t  of r e sou rces  under t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  group; a s  a  
process ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r e sources  o r  i n  t h e  degree  of c o l l e c t i v e  
c o n t r o l  . . . ." Ite d c f i n e s  povrr a s  " the  e x t e n t  t o  wllich tl ie outcomes 
of t h e  popu la t ion ' s  i n t e r a c t i o n s  wi th  o t h e r  populat ions  favor  i t s  
i n t e r e s t s  ove r  t hose  of t h e  o t h e r s ;  a c q u i s i t i o n  of power i s  an i u c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  f a v o r a b i l i t y  of such outcomes, l o s e  ofpowur a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e i r  
f a v o r a b i l i t y ;  p o l i t i c a l   over r e f e r s  t o  t h e  outcomes of i n t e r a c t i o n  
wi th  governments." I n  diagram form ( see ,  f o r  example. Figure  4-13) 8  
con tende r ' s  power p o s i t i o n  is rep resen ted  by t h e  l i n e  showing t h e  curve 
of probable  r e t u r n s .  (I.lithin t h a t  diagram T i l l y  i s  a b l e  t o  d e l i n e a t e  
both  "power e f f i c i e n c y "  and "power e f f ec t iveness . " )  Tllus T i l l y ' s  
concep tua l i za t ion  has  t h e  advantages  of avoiding c i r c u l a r i t y  i n  use  
of t h e  term power, providing d i s t i n c t  tarms f o r  va lue  p o s i t i o n  and 
va lue  p o t e n t i a l ,  and v i s u a l i z i n g  power i n  an  economic model t h a t  p rov ides  
nu i n t e r e s t i n g  new way o f  o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g  t h e  concept.  
I'owcr a s  "Socia l  Causation" 
Apart from ambigu i t i e s  o f  d e f i n i t i o n ,  however. t h e r e  is a  
f a r  more s e r i o u s  conceptual  problem i n  d e a l i n g  wi th  power which 11;s r o o t s  
i n  e p i s t m n l o g y .  Th i s  problem i s  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  of power wi th  causa t ion .  
Chief ly  due t o  t h e  work o f  Lbbert Dahl,  p o l i t i c a l .  s c i e n t i s t s  have come 
e x p l i c i t l y  t o  recognize  t h a t  power is a  c a u s a l  no t ion .  t h a t  power is i n  
some sense  " s o c i a l  causat ion."  However, we would n o t  a l l e v i a t e  o u t  
problem here  by out lawing t h e  r ead ing  of Dahl,  f o r  i m p l i c i t  i n  most I 
debate8 about  power a r e  con t rove ra i ea  about  c a u s a l i t y .  Doh1 aimp1.y d i d  
everyone a f avo r  by p u t t i n g  t h e  c a r d s  on t h e  table.' I n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  
of Amcrican p o l i t i c a l  s c i ence ,  tlre l onges t  sus t a ined  controversy of t h e  
post-wnr per iod has  been t h e  "plural is t -power  e l i t e "  deba te ,  now evolved 
i n t o  t h e  "agenda-eetting" deba te .  The volumes of l i t e r a t u r e  produced on 
t h i s  gene ra l  t o p i c  havc s u r e l y  s e t  a new reco rd  i n  t h e  annala  o f  
talking-past-one-another.  I f  we l e a v e  a s i d e  t h e  s u r f a c e  f r i l l s  and 
examine t h e  cen t r a l .  argrnnent, we soon aee  t h a t  t h e  e s sence  of t h e  deba te  
has  n o t  l o i n  i n  c o n f l i c t i u g  "empir ical  evidence" o r  i n  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  t h e  
" p o s i t i o n a l  s t r a t e g y "  ve raus  t h e  "decision s t r a t e g y "  ve r sus  t h e  
" r epu ta t iona l  s t r a t egy . "  Hather ,  t h e  d i s p u t a n t s  a r e  end leaa ly  a rgu ing  
about  c a u s a l i t y .  Note, f o r  example, t h a  s a l i e n c e  of "no, a c t i o n  a t  a 
d i s t ance , "  "an t i c ipa t ed  r e a c t i o n s , "  end grounds of i n f e r e n c e  i n  t h i s  
l i t e r a t u r e .  
Why ~ I I  it s o  a e r i o u s  t h a t  power i s  t r e a t e d  a s  s o c i a l  causa t ion?  
I n  a n u t s h e l l ,  because (a)  f o r  two hundred yea r s  ph i lo sophe r s  have had 
such d i f f i c u l t i e e  i n  handl ing t h e  concept  o f  cause  t h a t  many ph i lo sophe r s  
and a c i e n t i a t a  t r y  t o  avoid  i t  a l t o g e t h e r ,  and (b) t h e r e f o r e ,  when 
.concept ions  of power a r e  entangled wi th  t h e  concept  o f  c a u s a l i t y ,  s o c i a l  
a c i e n t i e t s  o s t e n s i b l y  e x p l i c a t i n g  power a r e  r e a l l y  wrangling about  i s s u e s  
t h e  g r a v i t y  of which they f r equen t ly  do n o t  even perceive-- issues  which 
some o f  t h e  g r e a t e s t  minds i n  t h e  western  world have been unable  t o  r e s o l v e .  
Obvious1 y ,  t hen ,  1 i t t l . e  p rog res s  can be expected--that i s ,  t h e o r e t i c a l  
work w i l l  probably n o t  be cumulative--if power i s  conceived of aa  s o c i a l  
causation. Of cour se ,  one encounters  problems i n  o t h e r  a r e a s  of s o c i a l  
2 ~ i l l i n u l  l l iker  a l s o  wrote  an i ~ n p o r t a n t  a r t i c l e  [Lliker 19641 on 
tlre o s s o c i a t i o a  o f  power wi th  causa t ion  ( t o  be d i scussed  below). 
s c i ence  t h a t  a l s o  r e s u l t  from deba te s  ove r  causa l i t y - - i . e . .  what should we 
i n f e r  from c o r r e l a t i o n s ;  why should we assume t h n t ,  because  black 
c h i l d r e n  i n  i n t e g r a t e d  schoo l s  "do b e t t e r . "  according t o  n a t i o n a l  t e a t s .  
we can improve blnck p e r f o m n c e  by buaing c h i l d r e n ;  e t c . ;  t h e  examples 
a r e  legion--but t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  h e r e  i a  t h a t  t h e  very concept  of power 
which we a r e  t r y i n g  t o  d e f i n e  and ope ra t iona l . i zc  i s . t r e a t e d  a s  syoonymoua 
wi th  causality. 
I n  an  e a r l y  paper Dahl recognized t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  c r en ted  by 
t h i s  a s s o c i a t i o n  and t r i e d  t o  a idea t ep  t h e  problem by an o p e r a t i o n a l  
d e f i n i t i o n .  He f i r s t  provided an  " i n t u i t i v e "  d e f i n i t i o n  of power: 
"A has  power over  B t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  he can g e t  D t o  do something t h a t  
B would n o t  o the rwi se  do." [Dahl 1957: 202-2031 He followed t h i s  w i th  a 
comu~ent about  t h e  ques t ions  t h a t  "liume and h i s  successors"  r a i s c d  and a 
r ecogn i t i on  t h a t  because of t h e  "need t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  mere ' a s s o c i a t i o n '  
from 'cause"' 
. . . t h e  a t t empt  t o  d e f i n e  power. could push u s  i n t o  s o w  
messy ep i s t emolog ica l  problems t h a t  do n o t  seem t o  have 
any g e n e r a l l y  accepted s o l u t i o n s  a t  t h e  moment. 1 s h a l l  
t h e r e f o r e  q u i t e  d e l i b e r a t e l y  s t e e r  c l e a r  of t h e  p o s e i b l e  
i d e n t i t y  o f  "power" nnd "cause," and t h e  hos t  o f  problems 
t h i s  i d e n t i t y  might g ive  r i s e  t o .  [Dahl 1957: 2031 
He then  s t a t e d  t h a t  power is a r e l a t i o n  among people ,  and went on t o  
t u r n  h i a  s t a t emen t s  about  power r e l n t i o n a  i n t o  p r o b a b i l i t y  s ta tements .  
Thus: "The power of an a c t o r .  A.'would seem t o  be adequate ly  de f ined  by 
t h e  measure M which is t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of an e v e n t ,  
g iven c e r t a i n  a c t i o n  by A, and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  an  even t  g iven no such 
a c t i o n  by A." [Dahl 1957: 214) 
I n  t h i s  a r t i c l e  Dahl ' s  ch i e f  concern is wi th  t h e  t a s k  o f  
o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g  t h e  concept  of power. A s  mentioned e a r l i e r .  he  recognized 
tho inadequacies of operat ional  def in i t ions  based on resources; therefore 
he suggested a s  an o l te rnnt ive  the  use of probabil i ty atatements. ("The 
amount of an ac tor ' s  power can be represented by a probabil i ty statement: 
e.g., ' t l ~ c r  chances a r e  9 out  of 10 t h a t  i f  the President promises a 
judgeship t o  f i v e  key Senators. the  Senate w i l l  not override h i s  ve to , '  
e t c . 9 3  
These operat ionalizat ions a r e  simply statements of correlat ion.  
X w i l l  happen when Y happens in Z percentage of cases. Such a statement 
is t o  be accepted a s  equivalent t o  the  concept of power a s  "getting someone I 
t o  do something he would not otherwise do." But c lear ly  they a r e  sot I 
equivalent. A s  Doh1 i~nmediately admits, the  v a l i d i t y  of making such an I 
equivalence hinges upon inference ( j u s t  na i n  the  case of using resources). 
\ I 
To make a valid inference here about power, Ire contends, " three I 
necessary conditions" must be present: I 
1. There must be a "time lag ,  however small, from the act ion of I 
the ac tor  wl~o i s  said to  exert  power t o  the  responses of the  respondent. 
This requirement merely accords with one's i n t u i t i v e  bel ief  t h a t  A can 
hardly be said t o  have power over g unless A ' s  power attempts precede I 
a ' s  response." - 
2. [Tlhere is  no "act ion a t  a distance." Unless there is  
solue"connectiod' between A and 5. then no power r e l a t i o n  can be said t o  e x i s t .  I 
i 
3 , ~ a h l  is cer ta in ly  not t h e  only wr i te r  who has used correl.ationa1 
statements i n  t h i s  way. I have singled out  t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  not  for  i t s  
uniqueness but becouae Dahl is f a r  c learer  about the  problem he i s  tackling 
than most wr i te rs  are.  That is, I am not at tacking a "straw man"--quite 
t11e contrary. 
3 .  A ' s  ac t ion  must change the probabil i ty of g doing something. 
If 5 waa a s  l i k e l y  t o  read a book befora A threatened I ~ i m ,  we cannot any 
A had power over a. 
Such "necesaary conditions" do not simply "accord with 
one's i n t u i t i v e  be l ie fs"  about evidence; on the contrary,  fo r  centuries 
tlre c r i t e r i a  of time, connection and change i n  r e s u l t s  lmve been used ea 
evidence of causal  relationslrips. It i s  precisely the va l id i ty  and 
adequacy of such types of evidence t h a t  is "up for  grabs" in  modern 
philosophy. 
Thus we begin with a causal concept of power, an " in tu i t ive  
notion"; e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e  t h a t  we u i l l .nvoid  t h i s  notion of couaali ty;  
operat ionalize the concept of power a s  a probabil i ty statement o r  
statement of cor re la t ion ;  search for  evidence of cor re la t ion ;  end 
i n f e r  a causal  re la t ionsh ip  on t h e ' b a s i s  of conditions accompanying tlre --- 
correlated events. We have come f u l l  c i r c l e .  Ue i n f e r  on the basis  of 
what we have already rejected.  
In h i s  l a t e r  work Dahl abandoned a l l  diff idence about equating 
power with soc ia l  causation. For example: "One menning i n  p o l i t i c a l  
discourse of the statement t h a t  'A has power over B with respect  t o  X' 
is simply t h a t  A (under cer ta in  condit ions)  can cause 1 to  a c t  X (with a 
probabil i ty of P ) .  To put tlre matter t h i s  way mny render the notion of  
power ra ther  peculiar  a s  a cen t ra l  concept i n  p o l i t i c a l  science: h e 8  
any other  f i e l d  of empirical invest igat ion take cause i t s e l f ,  i n  t h i s  
instance cause i n  interpersonal  r e l a t i o n s ,  a s  on object  of study? P e r b p s  
4 A convenient summary of the  debate over causal i ty i s  available 
i n  Ajdukiewicz 1973: 129-131.' 
not ."  [l)a111 1965: 89) Itother than a t t empt ing  t o  r e so lve  t h e  problem, 
Doh1 ( l i k e  many o t h e r  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s )  simply concluded t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  
t h e  ep i s t rmolog ico l  IHYUC~.  t h e  concept o f  cause  was e s s e n t i a l  and t h e r e f o r e  
must be uiied ( t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  equ iva l en t  o f  "Damn t h e  torpedoes;  f u l l  
upeed ol~ead :") . 
'To make ma t t e r s  worse, a s  William Riker has  shown, " a t  l e a s t  two 
urein types  of no t ions  of c a u s a l i t y  u r e  used i n  a o c i a l  s c i e n c e  diecourse .  
One i s  a  not ion of nmrg ina l i t y ,  t h e  o t h e r  is a  no t ion  of necessary  and 
s u f f i c i c n c  condi t ion."  [Riker  1964: 3461 The f i r s t  he r e f e r s  t o  a s  
"recipe-cnusol i ty ,  " drawing on a  term coined by Douglas Gasking [19551. 
Th i s ,  i t  seeuls t o  ule, may be equated wi th  t h e  no t ion  of cause  a s  
"luechanical force"  ( see  below). The second viow r e d e f i n e s  causality "so 
t h a t  i t  has  t h e  same l o g i c a l  form a s  t h e  equivalence r e l a t i o n  and sooletimes 
f u r t l ~ e r u ~ o r e  s o  t h a t  t h e  two c l a u s e s  have a  s i m i l a r  temporal and s p a t i a l  
reference."  llere "cauue" i s  u s i ~ a l l y  equated wi th  "necessary  and s u f f i c i e n t  
cond i t i on .  " Hiker 's t h e s i s  is t h a t  "d i f f e rences  i n  tl ie no t ion  of cause  
utand back o f  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  no t ion  o f  power." Ile d e l i n e a t e s  
f i v e  d i f f e r e n t  coacept ions  of power i n  c u r r e n t  l i t e r n t u r e ,  broadly  groups 
them i n t o  "ego-oriented power" and "other-or iented power," and contends 
t l ~ o t  " the re  is a d l r e c t  p i l r a l l c l i sm (a)  between ego-oriented power and 
necessary-oncl-sufficient-condition c a u s s l i t y  and (b) between o the r -  
o r i cn t ed  power and r e c i p e  c a u s a l i t y .  It is no t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  t h i s  
p a r a l l e l i s m  e x i s t s ,  f o r  power and cause  o r e  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  concepts .  
Power i s  p o t e n t i a l  cause. Or. power is t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  e x e r c i s e  i n f l u e n c e  
whi le  cause is t h e  a c t u a l  e x e r c i s e  of it." [Riker  1964: 3471 
Riker sugges t s  t h a t .  g ivan t h e  ambigu i t i e s  i n  t h e  concept of 
power, "we ought t o  banish it," b u t ,  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h a t  "each d e f i n i t i o n  
s p e c i f y  c l e a r l y  t h e  kind of theory of cause  i t  r e f l e c t s . "  The f i v e  
d e f i n i t i o n s  of power he d e s c r i b e s  o r e  t hose  of Sliaplry and Shubik, 
Jomas Mnrch, b b e r t  Dahl,  Dorwin Car twright  and Ceorg Karlsson. 
I n  more r e c e o t  l i t e r a t u r e  c e r t a i n  n l t e r a a t i v e  s o l u t i o ~ ~ s  t o
t h e  problem o f  d e f i n i n g  power have been suggested.  While t h e r e  i s  no t  
room he re  (no r ,  f o r  t h a t  ma t t e r ,  s u f f i c i e n t  knowledge i n  t h i s  co rne r )  
f o r  o  fu l l - f l edged  survey,  on i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h r e e  d i v e r s e  alternatives 
may be h e l p f u l  a s  a  background t o  d i scuss ion  of T i l l y ' s  proposal .  
The Desc r ip t ion  o f  Power i n  I n t e n t i o n a l  Explanat ions  
Because o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  "power a s  cause ,"  some have 
suggested scrapping t h e  whole cover ing law framework o f  explanot ion i n  
t r e a t i n g  power and tu rn ing  i n s t e a d  t o  an  i n t e n t i o n a l  form o f  exp lano t ion  
(sometimes c a l l e d  a  t e l e o l o g i c a l  exp lana t ion ,  a l though t h i s  term m y  be 
mis leading because o f  t l ie a s s o c i a t i o n  wi th  A r i s t o t e l i a n  philosophy). An 
i n t e n t i o n a l  form of explaunt ion i s  s u i t e d  on ly  t o  t h e  ntully of human a c t i o n ,  
and a t t empt s  t o  exp la in  human behavior  i n  terms of r easons ,  which may 
be goa l s ,  purposes ,  maxims, o r  mar01 r u l e s .  By c o n t r a s t ,  a  cover ing low 
type o f  explanot ion is no t  l i m i t e d  t o  a n a l y s i s  o f  human a c t i o n  and 
a t t empt s  t o  e x p l a i n  and/or  p r e d i c t  why and when something can be 
expected t o  happen by r e fe rence  t o  observed pos t  rep.111ar i t ies .  
i n  sequence o f  even t s ,  a s soc i a t ed  c o n d i t i o n s ,  e t c .  (This is Snmctlmea 
c a l l e d  "causal  explanat ion,"  a  mis leading term which  lend^ n l s o  t o  some 
coofusion. )  Th i s  i a ,  o f  cou r se ,  t h e  p a t t e r n  of explanot ion used i n  
n a t u r a l  sc ience.  Uy and l a r g e ,  i t  has  been adopted by s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  
a s  w c l l ,  particularly by those  committed t o  t h e  n p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  
~ ~ l e t l ~ o d  t o  t h e  s t u J y  of s o c i a l  phenomena. 
By c o n t m s t ,  due t o  t h e  p e c u l i a r  c h o r n c t e r i s t i c s  of s o c i a l  
phenomena, many of t hose  f avor ing  on i n t e n t i o n a l  approach contend t h a t  
t l ~ e  s o c i n l  s c i ences  r e q u i r e  a s p e c i a l  form o f  exp lano t ion ,  and some 
r e j e c t  t h e  very no t ion  of t h e  " s c i e n t i f i c "  s tudy  of s o c i e t y .  A r ecen t  
exnmplc of an intent101101 opproocll is provided by Terence Ha l l ,  who . 
nrgucs t h a t  "power exp lana t ions  cannot  be ' c ausa l '  i n  t h e  sense  
r equ i r ed  Ily covering-law theory.  inasmuch a s  t h e r e  o r e  no genuine . 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  warrant  them." [ H a l l  1975: 206) According t o  B a l l ,  
" t l ~ e  cover ing low model of exp lana t ion  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  c a u s a l  exp lana t ions  
be  warranted by universal laws." Ilia a u t h o r i t y  h e r e  is Hempel. B a l l  contends:  
A l l  power a t t r i b u t i o n s  o r e  c o n d l t i o n o l  a s c r i p t i o n s  & 
some n b i l i t y ~  capac i ty  t o  do c e r t a i n  k inds  of t h ings .  -
perform c e r t a i n  k inds  of a c t i o n s ,  o r  whatever.  So we say 
t lmt  t h e  a c i d  foo d i s s o l v e  t h e  substance and t h a t  t h e  prime 
nliniatc: ceo d i s s o l v e  t h e  Par l iament :  and both  of t h e s e  a r e  
power o t t r i b u t i o n o .  But t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  l i e s  i n  what is, o r  
can be ,  e n t a i l c d  by n f u l l  s ta tement  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  cond i t i one .  
In  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  a c i d ,  t h e  con e n t a i l s  will.. supposing t h e  
r e l evnn t  cond i t i ons  t o  o b t a i n .  Not s o  f o r  t h e  prime nl in is ter :  
t o  say t h a t  Ila foo d i s s o l v e  Par l iament  under c e r t a i n  cond i t i ons  
is noC, t o  soy t h a t  h e  15111 d i s s o l v e  i t  whenevcr t hose  cond i t i ons  
ob ta in .  111 t h e  c a s e  of human agen t s ,  t h e  exp lane to ry  
need n o t  e n t a i l  t h e  p r e d i c t i v e  m. Therefore  power 
exp lana t ions  do no t  conform t o  t h e  "symmetry t h e s i s "  o f  
covering-low t l ~ e o r y ,  which holds  t h a t  exp lonn t ions  and 
p r e d i c t i o n s  n r e  l o g i c a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  and in terchangenble .  
[Ha l l  1975: 2141 
Hn l l ' s  argument t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  power should be  analyzed i n  t h e  framework - 
of i n t e n t i o n n l  exp lana t ion  is based, t hen ,  i n  p o r t  on t h e  i d e a  t h a t  
power r e l a t i o n s l ~ i p s  do no t  confqrm t o  t h e  format r equ i r ed  o f  cover ing law 
t l ~ e o r y .  Ilotrever, he  goes beyond t h i s  t o  a rgue  t h a t  "power-re la t ions  
between human beings  a r e  i n t e n t i o n o l :  t h e r e  cnn be no   intentional o r  
'unconscious'  e x e r c i s e  o f  power; t h e  idea  of e x e r c i s i n g  power hoe an  
element of i n t e n t i o n  ' b u i l t  i n t o '  it." [Bo l l  1975: 2021 He sugges t s  
t l ~ a t  s o c i a l  phenomena def ined a s  power r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  more occu ro te ly  
desc r ibed  i n  terms of reason-governed, r a t h e r  t han  universal - low 
exp lana t ions .  Two examples he  c i t e s  a r e  Dahl ' s  example of o policeman 
d i r e c t i n g  t r a f f i c  and t h e  Miller-Stolces "causnl model of consti . tuency 
in f luence  i n  Congress." Ba l l  concludes  t h a t  t h e  observable  r e g u l u r i t y  
seen i n  t h e  two examples "is an  a r t i f a c t  o f  a ru l e ( s ) ;  f o r  i t  provides  
evidence t h a t  men know, have l e a r n e d ,  and a r e  c o r r e c t l y  f o l l o w i n & t h e  
r e l e v a n t  r u l e ( s ) . "  By c o n t r a s t ,  " the  idea  of leorninl ;  a law o f  nature-- 
a s  d i s t i n g u i s h e d ,  o f  cou r se ,  from l e a r n i n g  of o r  obouc it--would be  
absurd. . . ." Hence t h e s e  "power" r e l a t i o n o l ~ i p s  a r e  b e t t c r  understood 
i n  r a t i o n a l  o r  r u l e - r e f e r r i n g  than i n  llumean c a u s a l  terms." [Ho l l  1975: 2091 
Bo l l  f a i l s  t o  convince on s e v e r a l  grounds. For one,  t h e  cover ing 
law model he o f f e r s  ( t h a t  of Ilempel) i s  unnecessa r i l y  r i g i d .  Ual.1 i s  
very mis leading i n  sugges t ing  t h a t  e i t h e r  we must adopt  Ilempel's vicw 
o f  u n i v e r s a l  law o r  e l s e  we must accep t  an i n t e n t i o n o l  form of exp lana t ion .  
lie c r e a t e s  a f a l s e  dilemma, because t h e  o p t i o n s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  s o  
l i m i t e d .  l ben t i e th -cen tu ry  cover ing law models even i n  t h e  phys i ca l  
s c i e n c e s  may t a k e  t h e  form o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  s t a t emen t s .  A s  phys i ca l  
s c i e n c e  i l l u s t r a t e s ,  t h e  i s s u e  of mechanical f o r c e  causa t ion  i s  sepa rab le  
from t h e  cove r ing  law iosue.5 The p h y s i c i s t s .  presumably, have succeeded 
5'rhe e x t c n t  t o  wlrich concept ions  of p o l i t i c a l  power o r e  
dependent on Ga l i l ean  o r  Newtonion n o t i o n s  of mcchonical f o r c e  a s  
bns i c  metaphors i s  no t  always npprec i a t ed .  Hot11 Bol l  1975 and Elcvorlond 
1969 d i s c u s s  t h i s .  Note McFarland [p. 11 ) :  "The i d e a  of f o r c e  
e s s e n t i a l l y  r e f e r s  t o  a cause  t h a t  puuhes; d e f i n i t i o n s  of powcr based on 
f o r c e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  r e f e r  t o  what happens when a f i r s t  c a u s a l  agent  
i n  f r e e i n g  themselves fr0111 t h e  s p e l l  of Newtonian o r  Ga l i l ean  metapl~ors .  
y e t  olonnge t o  r e t n i n  u , cove r ing  law form of exp lana t ion .  
111 u r g u i ~ l g  t h a t  " i f  p o l i t i c a l  power i s  indeed a  c a u s a l  concept ,  
then the re  181uut be g u l ~ c r o l  laws e v a i l a b l e  f o r  w n r r e n t i ~ ~ g  power-explanations," 
no11 i s  b l u r r i n g  two conceptuel  i s s u c a  toge the r  i n t o  one. 
Tllis is i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  111s llandling of tho two examples. Ile is  
r lu i te  rt1:llt i n  s l ~ o u i n g  t l ~ a t  both s i t u a t i o n s  can he I~ondl.ed by "rule-  
r e f e r r i n g  - explonotions." b u t  i t  docs  no t  f o l . 1 0 ~  t h s t  cover ing 
law e x p l o n o t i o ~ ~ s  o r e  t l l e r e fu re  inappropr i a t e .  It is unnecessa r i l y  
r e s t r i c t i v e  t o  i n s i s t  t l ~ a t  choice  o f  perspectl .ve must depend on t h e  
na tu re  of t h e  r u l e  o r  law t l la t  produces the  r e g u l a r i t y  i n  t h e  moto r i s t s '  
o r  congrossmen's behavior.  One could ,  f o r  exan~plc ,  simply regard t r a f f i c  
lows and vo t ing  r ig l l t s  a s  r e sou rces  and hypothesize  t l le t  t hose  who 
control.  such r e sources  l~ove  a  h ighe r  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  being obeyed than 
t l ~ o s c  who do no t .  Of cour se ,  when we do t h i s  we 1.eave ou rne lves  open t o  
t h e  inference problr111 mentioned e a r l i e r .  Itowever, i t  should be noted,  t h i s  
is no t  t h e  sonla i n fe rence  problem Ba l l  r e f e r s  t o  when he says  of t h e  
Eliller-Stolces "causoL model" t h a t  t h e  laws nacded co l i c e n s e  such in fe rence  
a r e  nowl~ere ovuilrrble.  I!ven a  "law o f  nature ,"  which he s e e s  a s  a p p r o p r i a t e  
t o  coverinf; law expl.enotion, would no t  help  u s  i n f e r  causa t ion .  
pus l lo sone  way ( fo rce )  and a  second c a u s a l  agent  puol~es  ano the r  way 
( r e s i s t a n c e )  . . . . Incen t ives  and u t i l i t i e s  a r e  inward s u b j e c t i v e  
couses t h a t  pusll and pul.l; i n  o t h e r  words, they a t e  s u b j e c t i v e l y  
experienced fo rces .  llence, d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  power o r  i n f luence  t h a t  r e f e r  
t o  C 's  monil~ul.ation of R's u t i l i t y  func t ion  o r  i n c e n t i v e  system merely add 
a  s e t  o f  in termediary  v a r i a b l e s  t o  t h e  idea  o f  power n s  causa t ion :  C couses 
a  c h u n ~ e  i n  ll 's  u t i l l t i e v  o r  i n c e n t i v e a  ( t h e  in termediary  var iabl .es) ,  which, - 
i n  t u r n ,  cause  a  cl~anp,e i n  K ' s  bellavior.  D e f i n i t i o n s  of power t h a t  empllasize 
t h e  l a s t  uddod member of o  minimnl winning c o a l i t i o n  e s s e n t i a l l y  r e f e r  t o  
tho idea  o f  necessary  and s ~ r f f i c i e n t  cause. . . . The l o s t  t o  j o i n  provides  
t h e  f i n a l  o w u n t  of needed f o r c e  o r  c a u s a l  pusl~."  (Note here  t l ~ a t  PlcFarlnnd 
f indo  o  cormlmn denominator i n  t h e s e  n o t i o n s  of power a s  causa t ion  where 
Kilcer d i s t i n g u i s h e s  two no t ions  o f  c a u s a l i t y . )  1 
To me i t  would seem t h a t  t h e r e  is nothing about  t h e  brood 
s u b j e c t  ma t t e r  o f  power r e l a t i o n s h i p s  thnc i n t r i n s i c a l l y  malces on ly  one 
form o f  exp lana t ion  appropr i a t e  t o  t h e  concept o f  power. A t  i s s u e  is 
n o t  t h e  t o p i c  of r e sea rch  bu t  t h e  s p e c i f i c  purposes oE t h e  r e sea rche r  
and t h e  type of evidence a v a i l a b l e .  Sometimes on i n t e n t i o n a l  exp lana t ion  
w i l l  produce f o r  r i c h a r  r e s u l t s ;  a t  o t h e r  t imes  i t  sllnply mily no t  be 
workable. Ilowever. i t  is important  no t  t o  nuke U a l l ' s  mis take of 
erlunting covering-low forms o f  explonot ion wi th  s p e c i f i c a l l y  cnusnl  
ones  t h a t  i n  f a c t  r e l y  on outdated phys i ca l  metaphors. 
Power a s  "Cause" o r  Power a s  "Effect"? 
Geoffrey Debnam sugges t s  another  l i n e  of a t t a c k  on t h e  "power 
problem." I n  a  r e c a n t  a r t i c l e  ( con t r ibu ted  a s  y e t  e n o t l ~ e r  cllnpter i n  
t h a t  weary sngn, t h e  c o m u n i t y  power i lebnte) ,  he noted cha t  "power" has  
bean used t o  d e s c r i b e  both  cause  and e f f e c t  and t h a t  " i f  we cont inue 
us ing  t h e  some word t o  d e s c r i b e  both  we coufound unders tanding by 
obscur ing what is t o  be exple iued."  [Debnom 1974: 8981 l lere Dcbnam po in t8  
t o  y e t  ano the r  senee i n  which t h e  term "cause" is sometimes used. Ile 
is simply making t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between "input" and "outcome" v a r i a b l e s .  
The problem is t l ~ a t  pover is used a s  both  a n  "input" und.an "outcome" 
term, wl~ich obviously  cannot work. While t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
Debnam's po in t  and t h a t  of Simon I n  t h e  a r t i c l e  c i t e d  e a r l i e r  i s  ev iden t .  
Debnam's s o l u t i o n  is a  b i t  d i f f e r e n t .  Debnam suggcsta  t h a t  we s h i f t  ou r  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  "e f f ec t "  r o t l ~ a r  tllen t h e  "cause," and sugges t s  t l ~ o t  
i f  we norrow t h i s  t o  "intended e f f e c t s "  we w i l l  llove o  more v e r i f i a b l e  
concept .  
C e r t a i n l y  Ite is no t  a l o n e  i n  r e s t r i c t i n g  power t o  i n t e n t i o n a l  
a c t i o n .  Uer.trand l t u s s e l l ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  of power a s  " the  product ion o f  
in tended r f f c c t s "  has  had popu la r i t y  both among t l ~ e o r i s t s  u s ing  in t en -  
t i o n a l  forms of exp lana t ion  arid tliove ( s u c l ~  a s  William Camson) concerued 
wi th  cauoul models of power (both i n  t h e  cover ing law explanat ion and 
i n  t he  specifically n~cc l~nn ica l - fo rce  sense  OF t h e  term). According t o  
I)rhnsm. "A d e f i n i t i o u  of ' i n t e n t i o n s '  and ' e f f e c t s '  [roses no more 
problems t l ~ a n  does  a  d e f i u i t i o n  of ' i s s u e '  o r  ' dec i s ion . '  111 both  c a s e s  
t h e  problem of e s t ab l i s l i i ng  a  r e q u i s i t e  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a r i s e s ,  
bu t  can bo d e a l t  witli on ly  by t h e  obse rve r  u s ing  s t a t e d  c r i t e r i a  w i th in  
t h e  con tex t  of a  s p e c i f i c  study." [p. 8991 I would say  i n  r e p l y  t h a t  
dofininj:  " in t en t ion"  i s  more l i k e  d e f i n i n g  " r a t i o n a l i t y , "  and t h a t  
v a r i a b l e  l e v e l s  of s i y n i f i c n n c c  i n  v a r i a b l e  con tex t s  probably means no 
concept.  Bringing " l n t e n t ~ o n s "  i n  t o  a n a l y s i s  o f  power is r a t h e r  l i k e  
l e t t i n g  t h e  camel's nose i n t o  t h e  t e n t .  
In an a r t i c l e  on "Power and In t en t ion"  D. M. White r a i s e d  a  
rlumber o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  ques t ions  about  t h e  concept  of i n t e n t i o n .  [IJhite 
19711 I t  is no t  p o s s i b l e  t o  provide an  adequate  summary of tho i s s u e s  
here .  Ras i ca l ly ,  tiowever., Wl~i te  a rgues  t h a t ,  once " in t en t ions"  a r e  
i n t roduceJ ,  we e i t l ~ o r  r e l y  on a n  excess ive ly  r a t i o c i n a t i v e  model of 
p o l i t i c a l  behavior ,  o r  we f i n d  t h a t  we have admit ted t h e  broad problem of 
" s t a t e s  of mind" i n t o  o u r  t e n t .  The concept of power emerges, according 
t o  White, us  "even more i n t r a c t a b l e  than i t  has  been seen t o  be." 
[ I lh i te  1971: 7491 111 any c a s e ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i n t e n t i o n  
mnkes power a  more v e r i f i a b l e  concept  than i t  previously  seemed t o  be.6 
6 ~ a l l  r e f e r s  t o  Wliite'a a r t i c l e  i n  n  foo tno te .  however i n  t h a t  
p a r t i c u l a r  con tex t  i t  sounds a s  though he views Write a s  providing evidence 
f o r  h i s  own t h e s i s  t h a t  power has  an  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  requirement.  On t h e  
con t r a ry ,  White seems q u i t e  ambivalent and shows how d i f f i c u l t  t h e  t o p i c  
of i n t e n t i o n  l a  and how i t  complicates  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  power. 
Power a s  "Causation o f  Outcomes by Preferences"  
An important  and s t i m u l a t i n g  r e c e n t  e f f o r t  t o  d e a l  w i th  t h e  
problem of concep tua l i z ing  power is provided by Jack Nngel i n  h i s  book 
The Desc r ip t ive  Analysis  o f  Power. Nagel s t r e s s e s  t h e  a d J e c t i v e  
"desc r ip t ive"  i n  t h e  t i t l e  of t h a t  book, s t a t i n g  tl~st "explnnatory" 
o r  "p red ic t ive"  ana lyses  must awa i t  f a r  m r e  complex theo r i e s .  Discuss ions  
of power based l a r g e l y  on outcome, o r  e f f e c t  measures, can on ly  he 
d e s c r i p t i v e .  (See e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  concluding chap te r  on t l l i s  po in t . )  
Nagel d e f i n e s  pover b a s i c a l l y  a s  "causat ion of outcomes by preferences." 
[Nngel 1975: 1441 More e l a b o r a t e l y ,  "A power r e l a t i o n ,  a c t u a l  o r  
p o t e n t i a l ,  is an  a c t u a l  o r  p o t e n t i a l  cauuaZ r e l a t i o n  between t h c  
p re fe rences  of on a c t o r  r ega rd in8  an  outcome and t h e  outcome i t s e l f . "  
[Nagel 1975: 291 Nagel 's work muot be seen 5s an i n t e r e s t i n g  synt l ies ia  
of t h e  i d e a s  of Simon. Dnlil, and p re fe rence  theo ry ,  under taken i n  
p a r t  a s  response t o  t h e  agenda-set t ing deba te  ( subaa t  of t h e  con~munity 
power debate)  s e t  o f f  by Hachrach and Uarntz yeu r s  ago. 
The key f i g u r e  he re  is Simon. Among s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  t h e  
most importaut  a t t empt  t o  s a lvage  c a u s a l i t y  on a  s e r i o u s  I ~ a s i s  was mnde 
by Herber t  Simon i n  a  s e r i e s  o f  b r i l l l e n t  papers.  (For a  s imple  summary. 
s e e  Simon 1968. Nagel e l s o  s u p p l i e s  5 ve ry  h e l p f u l  ellmmary i n  Chapter 4  
of h i s  book.) Simon developed a  concept ion of c a u s a l i t y  a s  a  dependency 
r e l a t i o n ,  a  kind of asymmetrical co r r e l a t io l r  between v a r i a b l e s .  Simon 
u t i l i z e d  milthematical equa t ions  f o r  t l ~ i s  purpose. Since  i n d i v i d u a l  
equa t ions  a r e  symmetricsl.  Simon recognized t h a t  c a u s a l i t y  could be 
de~mnstrs ted--assuming i t  was, a s  comruonly ossumed, an  asymrnrtrictI1 
re la t ion--only  through a  s t r u c t u r e  of equa t ions  organized S O  t l ln t  t h e  
s o l u t i o o  OF succeediog equot ioos  must be  dependent on o t h e r s ,  u l t i m a t e l y  
culminat iog i n  nu equut ion whose s o l u t i o n  is sel f -conta ined.  L I  l i n e  
w i t l ~  Ilumr, and q u i t e  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  f o r  o concept based on ourthemntics, 
Simon a s s e r t s  t h a t  "causal  o r d e r i n g s  a r e  simply p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  
sc lent is t !s  model." [Simon 1957: 111 That is, a s  Nagel r eph rases  i t .  
"causot ioo is a r e l a t i o n  between e lements  i n  a t l ~ e o r y ,  no t  between 
o b J c c t s  o r  even t s  i n  t h e  r e n l  world. A concapt ioo s o  premised avoids  
o b J e c t i o ~ b l s  mrtaphyslcnl  imp l i ca t ions .  " [ N a ~ e l  1975 : 361 While t h i n  
idea  u i c a l y  addres ses  p o r t  of Ilu~oe's inconvenient  argumaot , i t  has  
t h e  disadvantnge wi th in  Sluton's work ( i t  seems t o  me) o f  b a s i c  
i r r d e v a n c e  t o  h i s  work oo  power. When he t u r n s  t o  add res s ing  power 
( a s  i n  "Notes on t h e  Obscwa t ioo  and Eleaauremeot o f  P o l i t i c a l  yower"), 
t h e  a n a l y s i s  r e a u l t s  i n  r a t h e r  o rd ina ry  s t a t emen t s  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  
"we wLs11 t o  observe how a chaoge i n  t h e  behavior  of one ( t h e  in f luence r )  
a l t e r s  t l ~ c  bchnvior of t h e  o t h e r  ( t h e  iof luencee) ."  [Simon 1957: 77-76] 
Nagel recognizes  t h a t  Simon's work 00 power does  no t  measure . 
up t o  t h e  po ten t i a l ,  of t h e  work on c a u s a l i t y .  Ile a l s o  p o i o t s  o u t  t h a t  
t ho  m n t b c ~ ~ ~ n t i c s l  r e s u l t s  Simon a r r i v e d  a t  could be achieved a l t e r n a t i v e l y  
by pa th  a n a l y s i s ,  developed through t h e  work of Sewall \ . l r i g l~ t ,  a 
g e n e t i c i s t  concerned wi th  f a r  d i f f e r e n t  problems. But he  accep t s  Simon's 
b a s i c  i dea  of c a u s a l i t y .  At t h e  same time he accep t s  Dnhl's coocept ioo 
of power 08 a c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n .  Ilowever. he a l s o  recognizes  t h e  probl.em 
of "an t i c ipa t ed  r eac t ions , "  t h e  problem o f  i n t e n t i o n s  t h a t  R a l l ,  Deboam. 
and, among o t h e r s ,  Unchrach and Baratz  have pointed o u t .  In  an e a r l i e r  
a r t i c l a  rcspoodiog t o  t h e  agenda-set t ing l i t e r a t u r e ,  Nagel adopted a 
pl~enomenological approach. But i n  t h e  l a t e r  hook Nagel acknowledges t h e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  of determining i n t e n t i o n s  [Nagel 1975: 20-221 and o p t s  
i n s t e a d  f o r  p;eference theory whicl~ he contends  i s  more v e r i f i a b l e  
and a t  t h e  same time w i l l  a l l ow t h e  s o c i a l  u c i e n t i s t  t o  d e a l  w i t l ~  
t h e  psychological  problems t h a t  could no t  be handled by t l ~ c  convent ional  
(Dahl) decision-making approach. Wl~e t l~e r  o r  no t  Nngel s o l v c s  t h e  
major problems (which a r e  extremely d i f f i c u l t ) ,  IIC a t  l e a s t  d e a l s  wit11 
t h e  c e n t r a l  con t rove r s i e s  t h a t  have surrounded t h e  s u b j e c t  of power i n  
t h e  l a s t  twenty years .  Among t h e  ( p o l i t i c a l .  s c i eoce )  s t u d i e s  I have 
seen,  i t  seems t o  me t h a t  i t  i s  t h i s  work by' Nogel t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  
t h e  major s t u d y b y  which o t h e r  r e c e n t  s t u d i e s  o f  power must he judged. 
In  important  ways, Nagel add res ses  some o f  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
ques t ions  r a i s e d  by e a r l i e r  analysee .  Dy t r e a t i n g  power a s  a 
d i s p o s i t i o n a l  concept ,  he answers p a r t  of B a l l ' s  c r i t i q u e  o f  cover iog 
law exp lana t ions .  Eloreover, he provides  a s u i t a b l e  frame wort^ f o r  
cover ing law exp lana t ioos  of power even whi le  add res s ing  t h e  
"an t i c ipa t ed  r e a c t i o n s "  and r e l o t e d  i s s u e s  t h a t  h?ve been r a i s e d  
r epea ted ly  a g a i n s t  t h e  p l u r a l i s t s .  I m p l i c i t l y ,  Nagel rec:,goizes t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between "covering 1.aw" and specifica1.l .y "causal" i s s u e s  
i n  explanat ion.  He dec ides  t o  adopt  both--0 dec i s ion  t l ~ a t  i n  terma 
of t h e  e a r l i e r  s e c t i a n s  of t h i s  paper  is obviously  one t h a t  I regard 
a s  unwise. Ilowever. i f  one wishes t o  d e f i n e  power i n  terms of causa t ion ,  
i t  seems wise  t o  adopt  Simon's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of c a ~ ~ s a l i t y ,  and t h i s  
Nagel has  done.'] F i n a l l y ,  i n  p re fe rence  theory t h e  economists have 
probab1.y produced a concept  more "empir ical ly  v e r i f i a b l e "  than t h e  
broad concept  of i n t e n t i o n s  is i n  s o c i a l  s c i ence .  
7 ~ o r  a c r i t i c a l  view of Simon, however, s e e  Riker 1964: 347. 
Tll.ly's Concept of Power 
I f  we look a t  T i l l y ' s  d e l i n e a t i o n  of t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  an t eceden t s  
o f  c u r r e n t  ana lyses  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  we s e e  t h a t  Nagel ' s  and T i l l y ' s  
work a r i s e  o u t  of q u i t e  d i v e r s e  back&rounds. Despi te  klagel 's ev iden t  
concern to, respond t o  t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  cha l l enge  of t h e  "New Lef t , "  a s  
r ep rcsen ted  i u  t h e  agenda-set t ing l i t e r a t u r e ,  h i s  a n a l y s i s  is c l e a r l y  
witll in wllat l ' i l l y  has  c a l l e d  t l ~ e  Mil lean fro~ncwork. By c o n t r a s t ,  wh i l e  
T i l l y  1s responding t o  t h e  cha l l enge  of t h a t  r i g o r o u s  met l~odological  
fraacwork ( e s p e c i a l l y  t l ~ e  l i t e r a t u r e  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  c h o i c e ) ,  h i c  anal  y s i s  
and 111s d y ~ ~ ~ l ~ a t l ~ i c s  c e a r l y  lrelong witll wllat be i d e n t i f i e s  a s  a  Marxist 
framawork. Despi te  t h e  d i f f e r e n c a s ,  i t  is i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  both  f i n d  
tl1eu1se1~1)s druwn toward econu1111c theory.  While Nngel l ooks  t o  p re fe rence  
t l ~ a o r y .  ' l ' i l ly  b u i l d s  a  model of power based on econon~ic concepts  of 
r e t u r n  on ioves tn~en t  and p r o d u c t i v i t y  func t ions .  
T i l l y ' a  model i s  an a t t empt  t o  underetnnd c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
u i t l ~ l n  a  covcr ing law framework, and wi thout  r e f e rence  t o  p syc l~o log ica l  
vor iablc t l  ( s u c l ~  a s  r e l a t i v e  d e p r i v a t i o n )  and v a l u e s ,  a l t t ~ o u g h  of course  
s i n c e  I I ~  s e e s  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a s  l a r g e l y  i ~ s t r u m e n t n l  and t h e r e f o r e  
goa l -d i r ec t ed ,  obviously  an  essumptlon about  i n t e n t i o u s  l i e s  behind t h e  
nndel.  Ilowever, wlmt is p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  about  h i s  work i s  that 
pover l ~ e r e  is no t  a  c a u s a l  concept.  Tltis i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  c a u s a l  
n o t i o n s  have been e n t i r e l y  omi t t ed ;  whether i t  i s  i m p o s s i l ~ l e  t o  avoid  
t l~em a l t o g e t h e r  i n  s t u d i e s  of Ituman a c t i o n  I am n o t  s u r e ,  because i n  f a c t  
i t  has  been argued tlrat t h e  o r i g i n a l  no t ion  of cause  a s  producing agen t  
a r o s e  and is lnaintained by ou r  ana log iz ing  from o u r  exper ience a s  a c t o r s  
t o  n a t u r e  ( s ee  Cashing 1.955 and von Wright 1974). It may be impossible  -
t o  d ivo rce  our  exper ience of huuuln a c t i o n  a s  product ion,  a s  c r e a t i o n .  
from t h e  no t ion  o f  c a u s a l i t y ,  and i n  t h e  long  run  p e r f e c t l y  l e g i t i ~ ~ ~ a t e  
t o  a s s o c i a t e  them. Ilowever, g iven t h e  s t a t e  of philosophy a s  we l l  a s  
o f  s o c i a l  s c i ence  on t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  causa t iou ,  i t  seems w o r t l ~ w l ~ i l e  t o  
t r y  t o  d ivo rce  ou r  c e n t r a l  concepts  ( s u c l ~  a s  power) from p l ~ i l o s o p l ~ i c n l  
i s s u e s  we cannot handle. Nagel has  opted f o r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  Simon's 
so1;tion r e a l l y  is a  so lu t ion .  T i l l y ' a  proposal  is more open-ended; 
we a r e  o f f e r e d  a  workable definition purged of c c u s a l  n s soc ia t ions .  
Compare D a l ~ l ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  power w i t l ~  t l ~ a t  of T i l l y :  
llnhl: "A has  power over  8 t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  lie can g e t  D t o  do sone th ing  -
t h a t  I would n o t  otherwise do." llere power is t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  
a l t e r  a n o t h e r ' s  behavior ,  t o  "push" o r  "pul l"  cham i n  a  
c e r t a i n  d i r e c t i o n .  
T i l l y :  "The power o f  t h a t  p a r t y  is t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which i t s  i n t e r e s t s  
p r e v a i l  ove r  t h e  o t h e r s  w i th  which i t  i s  i n  conf1.ict." Power 
he re  is i n  some sense  an  outcome. Power is measured by t h e  
r a t i o  between inpu t  of r e sou rces  and r e sources  r e tu rned .  Ilowever, 
i t  is no t  s imply t l ~ a t  power is measured by outcomes ( a s  i n  
Nagel 's formulat ion)  but  t h a t  power i t s e l f  is  an  outcome. The 
concept  of power thus  produced has  t h e  advantages  o f  being both 
r e l a t i v e  and r e l a t i o n a l .  
Conclusion 
I have argued t h a t ,  g iven t h a  troublesome ep i s t emolog ic s l  s t a t u s  
of t h e  no t ion  of causa t ion ,  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  would do we l l  t o  avoid  
en tang l ing  t h e  concept  of power wi th  t h a t  of cause. The s i t u n t i o n  i s  made 
worse by t h e  p l e tho ra  of usages  of t h e  term "causc" and t h e  a d j e c t i v e  
"cousol." We have de l inea t ed  o t  l e a s t  fou r :  mechanical f o r c e ,  necessary  
ond s u f f i c i e n t  cond i t i on ,  cover ing low, i npu t  v a r i a b l e .  I f  one r e j e c t s  
t h e  sugges t ion  t h a t  "power" and "cause" con be d i sen tang led ,  then a t  l e a s t  
one ought t o  fol low Rike r ' s  adv ice  t o  s p e c i f y  c a r e f u l l y  t h e  no t ion  of 
cause  s s soc io t ed  wi th  a  p o r t i c u l o r  n o t i o n  of power. As h i s  s k i l l f u l  
d i u s e c t i o n  of va r ious  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  power shows. one needs t o  he 
extremely c o r e f u l  t o  svoill c o n t m i n a t i n g  one no t ion  of power witll an  
i n o l ~ p r o p r i a t e  s ense  of c a ~ r s o l i t y .  
Civen t h e  ambiguities I n  t h e  concept ion o f  power, ought  we 
t o  fol low Morcl~ ontl Rilcer's sugges t ion  t o  ovoid it a l t o g e t h e r ?  Perhaps, 
r o t l l r r  than cons ide r ing  t h e  ques t ion  of which no t ion  oE power t o  use ,  
we ouellt t o  a s k  whetllur "power" can be  u s e f u l l y  t r e a t e d  a t  a l l .  Hut 
how con we ovoid cons ide r ing  t h o t  t op ic?  I f ,  a s  is o f t e n  s a i d ,  t h e  
c e l ~ t r a l  i s s u e  i n  t h e  s tudy of p o l i t i c s  hits been "who ru l e s "  (and "who 
do tile r u l e s  favor") and w i t l ~ i n  p o l i t i c o l  philosophy, "who ehould r u l e , "  
t hen  i t  scams t l io t  onl i t t in8 "power" from cons ide ra t ion  would l e a v e  a  
ro t l l e r  l o r g e  hole .  Moreover, t h e  kind of pure  predic t ionism-ins t ruolenta l ism 
rep'resc~rted by Jalues Nnrcl~,  f o r  exoo~ple ,  is basically unsa t i s fy ing .  
Tllut is, aven i f  I were a b l e  t o  p r e d i c t  p e r f e c t l y  o  good many p o l i t i c a l  
ourcomes ( e l e c t i o n s ,  budgeting process  outcomes, impoct o f  demons tmt ions ,  
e t c . )  w i t l ~ o u t  u s ing  t l ~ e  concept  o f  power, simply by s p e c i f y i n g  tiome r u l e s  
of t he  guse ond some numbers based on p a s t  outcomes ord Ceeding 011 t h i s  
i n t o  o  computer, I a t  l e a s t  would remain u n s a t i s f i e d .  For such 
p r e d i c t i o u i s ~ n  o111y oddresses  t l ~ e  "llow," no t  t h e  "lll~y." \lhy a r e  t h e  r u l e s  
t he  woy tlley o re?  l41y is i t ,  i f  a  complex p rocess  determines  t h e  r e s u l t s .  
t h o t  those  r e s u l t s  seem systematically t o  f avor  some groups o r  i od iv iduo l s  
ond no t  o t l ~ e r s ?  I'erhaps t l ~ i s  i s  t h e  ch ie f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  ou r  
preoccupat ion wi th  p o l i t i c o l  power. Power is a "po in t e r  word"; i t  
p o i n t s  u s  toword t h e  "Why" ques t ious .  I n  con t inu ing  t o  osk t h e s e  
p e r s i s t e n t  ques t ions  obout  power, we con t iou r  t o  pursue,  i n  Ilowever 
bumbling, confusing and i r r i t a t i n g  o  mnnncr, t l ~ o s e  b o s i c  ques t ions  obout 
t h e  n a t u r e  of s o c i o l  r e a l i t y .  
Probably t h i s  e x p l a i n s  t h e  a s s o c i o t l o n  oC power w i t l ~  couuotiod. 
Uespi te  t h e  epiriteumlogical con fus ions ,  we f iud ou r se lves  p u r s l j n g  t h o t  
' 
thene: lniy d id  t h i s  happen? Wllat caused i t ?  I:vm i f  we accept  t h e  
view of some s c i e n t i s t s  t h o t  t h e r e  a r e  on ly  s t a t i s t i c a l  lows, on on 
everyday human l e v e l  i t  is d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e t t l e  f o r  such predic t ionism.  
Wa do,  i n  f a c t ,  t h i n k  i n  terms o f  "causes." 
Hut t h e  dileomur r e m i a s .  I f  we en tong le  t h e  very concept  of 
power wi th  causa t ion ,  t h e  l i k e l y  r e s u l t  w i l l  be  e n d l e s s  and no t  very  
p roduc t ive  argumeots l i k e  t h e  "power e l i t e  debote." Thus t h e  c l ~ o l l e n g e  
seenls t o  be  t o  develop a  concept ion of power t l io t  f o c i l i t n t e s  t hose  
"Wl~y" ques t ions  and y e t  avo ids  t h o t  b a s i c  equa t ion  o f  ,>over with cousot ion.  
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